VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0850/01 2811044
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081044Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9545
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4936
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2121
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1123
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6319

S E C R E T GENEVA 000850

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP MEETING, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009

REF: A. STATE 097473 (SFO-V-GUIDANCE-002)
¶B. GENEVA 0813 (SFO-GVA-V-020)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-029.

¶2. (U) Meeting Date: September 29, 2009
Time: 3:00 p.m. - 5:15 p.m.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

¶3. (S) At the September 29, 2009, meeting of the Working Group on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), chaired by Mr. Trout and Gen Orlov, the delegations went through a comparison of each side's proposed categories of data to be included in the database for the new treaty. The Russians confirmed that they would include many of the same categories of data as the United States on facilities and the items located there. Russia's aggregate data reflected its proposed treaty limits and counting rules, with the addition of aggregates of non-deployed items. Orlov unsuccessfully pressed for U.S. agreement to categorize data the way Russia had proposed.

¶4. (S) The Russian delegation agreed to include repair and production facilities for both mobile ICBM launchers and their associated ICBMs, and ICBM and SLBM loading facilities.

They would not agree to include throw-weight, and would not list separate aggregate numbers for mobile launchers or their associated ICBMs. They reacted negatively to the U.S. view that the Peacekeeper ICBM would not be declared in the new treaty because it was no longer deployed. For their part, the Russians made a new proposal to combine space launch facilities and test ranges.

DISCUSSION OF MOU DATA CATEGORIES

¶5. (S) Orlov opened the working group meeting and confirmed he had received the U.S. side-by-side comparison of the U.S. and Russian proposals (Refs A and B) for the MOU data base that was provided earlier in the day, and he agreed to discuss it. He then provided an unofficial Russian paper titled, "Main Composition of Data Base the Parties Intend to Exchange under the New Treaty."

Begin official translation of that paper:

Handed over by the Russian
Side on September 29, 2009

Official Translation

Main Composition of the Data Base the Parties Intend to Exchange under the New Agreement

¶1. List of SOAs proposed for inclusion in the data base:

Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs;
Deployed ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers;
Warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs;
Non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs;
Non-deployed ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers.

¶2. Aggregate data proposed for inclusion in the data base:

Aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs;
Aggregate number of deployed ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers;
Aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs;
Aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs.

¶3. List of facilities for which it is proposed that a data base be provided:

ICBM bases, bases of submarines equipped with SLBMs, and air bases for HBs;
Storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs;
Storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs;
Test ranges for ICBMs and SLBMs;
(Space launch facilities);
Training facilities (ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs);
HB flight test centers;
Repair facilities for SLBMs and HBs;
Conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs;
Conversion or elimination facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs and SLBM launchers;
Production facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs;
Production facilities for ballistic missile submarines;
Static display.

¶4. List of ICBM bases, bases of submarines equipped with SLBMs, and air bases for HBs for which the data base is

provided:

Russian Federation

ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs:
e.g., Dombarovskiy

ICBM bases for mobile ICBMs:
e.g., Vypolzovo

Submarine bases:
e.g., Yagel'naya

HB bases:
e.g., Ukrainka

U.S.

ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs:
e.g., Minot

Submarine bases:
e.g., Silverdale

HB bases:
e.g., Dyess

¶5. Data with respect to ICBM bases, bases of submarines equipped with SLBMs, and air bases for HBs, for which the sides intend to carry out exchanges:

Name and coordinates of the base;

Type of ICBM (SLBM, HB);

For each type:
Aggregate number of deployed ICBMs (SLBMs, HBs);
Aggregate number of deployed ICBM launchers (SLBM launchers);
Aggregate number of warheads on delivery vehicles located at a base;
Aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs (SLBMs and HBs);
Aggregate number of non-deployed ICBM launchers (SLBM launchers);
Launcher groups;
Silos used as launch control centers;
Other launch control centers.

End text.

¶6. (S) Trout indicated that the U.S. paper contained a side-by-side list of the categories of data that each Party proposed to include in analogous sections of the data base. Orlov jokingly regretted that the paper did not include a third column with compromise proposals. Trout responded that once the sides identified and understood the similarities and differences between the U.S. and Russian approaches, the U.S. delegation hoped to draft a proposed joint draft text (JDT) during the break in sessions. His goal for this meeting was to confirm what each side believed should be in the MOU. (Begin comment: The following paragraphs represent the U.S. side-by-side comparison of the U.S. positions and the Russian positions that were provided to the Russian delegation. End comment.)

¶7. (S) The United States would include in Section I of the MOU (Aggregate Numbers) the following two aggregate numbers:

- Deployed ICBMs/SLBMs and their associated launchers, deployed heavy bombers; and

- Nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs/SLBMs, Nuclear armaments on or associated with deployed heavy bombers.

¶8. (S) Russia's Section I of their draft annex (Ref B)

included the following five aggregate numbers:

- Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, Heavy Bombers;

- Deployed Launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs;

- Warheads on Deployed ICBMS, SLBMs, Heavy Bombers;

- Non-Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, Heavy Bombers; and

- Non-Deployed Launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs

¶9. (S) Orlov said the U.S. Non-Paper on the MOU (Ref A) that had been provided on September 21, 2009, had stated that throw-weight data should be in Section I. However, the United States had since decided that throw-weight should be declared in Annex F on ICBM and SLBM technical data. Orlov commented dryly that Russia would omit throw-weight data entirely, so moving it to Annex F was a step in the right direction.

¶10. (S) Trout asked why Russia included an aggregate number for non-deployed items in Section I when Russia was not proposing any numerical limits on such items. Colonel Ryzhkov answered that, in the Russian approach, non-deployed items would be subject to some limitations under the treaty, some information would be provided about them, and certain verification provisions would apply. Indeed, Ryzhkov added, one aim of the verification regime was to monitor non-deployed delivery vehicles, even though it would be only be to a limited extent. Russia considered it logical to list aggregate data for all items in Section I. In turn, Ryzhkov asked what the U.S. goals were for the verification regime regarding non-deployed delivery vehicles, and where the United States would list such aggregate data. Trout responded that the United States would include the data somewhere in the MOU, but viewed Section I as relating only to the central limits as defined in the treaty. Trout also described the U.S.-proposed verification regime for and limits on non-deployed mobile ICBMs and mobile launchers.

¶11. (S) Ryzhkov indicated dissatisfaction with limits on mobile ICBMs, and asked what the U.S. reasoning was for imposing them. Trout explained that the United States had always been concerned that mobile ICBMs were the only force that could be rapidly expanded without being readily observable. The START restrictions on mobile ICBMs were equal because the United States was planning at the time of the START negotiations to deploy Peacekeeper ICBMs in a mobile configuration. While many things were different now, the monitoring problem had not changed. The United States was looking mostly for transparency, along with some restrictions. Orlov commented that Russia could ask for the same with regard to other "mobile" systems, such as submarines, if the United States kept talking about mobile ICBMs.

¶12. (S) Trout went on to note that the United States would include a Section II in the MOU: Additional Aggregate Numbers. He said that Russia's proposal did not contain it. The numbers in it were associated with the limits the United States was proposing in our Article IV of the treaty. Section II would include:

- Non-Deployed ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

- Non-Deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at Test Ranges

- Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

  -- Mobile Test Launchers at Test Ranges

- Mobile Training Launchers

- Test Heavy Bombers

ICBM-RELATED DATA

¶13. (S) Trout added that the United States would retain an MOU Annex A: ICBMs and ICBM Launchers, which Russia had as part I of Section II of Section II of its Annex. The U.S. would again include two aggregate limits, as well as the following data:

- Additional Declared Values:

  -- Non-Deployed Aggregates

     --- ICBMs for Mobile Launchers
     --- ICBMs at Test Ranges
     --- Mobile Launchers for ICBMs

  -- Other Launcher Aggregates

     --- Test Launchers
     --- Mobile Test Launchers
     --- Training Launchers
     --- Mobile Training Launchers

- Facilities listed:

  -- Bases and Maintenance Facilities

  -- Loading Facilities

  -- Production Facilities
     --- ICBMs
     --- Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

  -- Storage Facilities
     --- ICBMs
     --- Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

  -- Repair Facilities
     --- ICBMs
     --- Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

  -- Test Ranges

  -- Training Facilities

  -- Elimination Facilities

- ICBM base data:

  -- Name and Coordinates of Facility

  -- Two Aggregate Numbers

  -- Coordinates of each silo

- Other facility data, to include the maintenance facility at ICBM bases:

  -- Non-Deployed ICBMs, Training Models of Missiles (TMOMs)

¶14. (S) Trout said the Russian Federation's Section II: ICBMs, SLBMs, Warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, ICBM Launchers, and SLBM Launchers; (I) ICBMs, Warheads on ICBMs, ICBM Launchers, would include the following data:

- Five aggregate limits would be declared at the beginning and for each base

- Additional Declared Values:

  -- None

- Facilities listed:

  -- Bases

  -- Production Facilities

  -- Storage Facilities
     --- ICBMs
     --- Mobile Launchers of ICBMs
  -- Test Ranges

  -- Training Facilities

  -- Conversion or Elimination Facilities
     --- ICBMs
     --- Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

- ICBM base data:

  -- Name and Coordinates of Facility

- Other facility data:

  -- Unknown

¶15. (S) After considerable probing by Trout, Orlov acknowledged it would make sense to list production facilities for mobile launchers in the Russian data. In addition, the sides decided it would be best to retain the category of loading facilities for both ICBMs and SLBMs. Although neither Party had any ICBM loading facilities, the category could be desired in the future. Russia also agreed to add repair facilities for ICBMs and mobile launchers if the United States would include that category too. The Russians promised to include aggregate numbers of items at each base, and the coordinates of each silo launcher, just as in START.

SLBM-RELATED DATA

¶16. (S) Trout added that the United States would retain an MOU Annex B (SLBMs and SLBM Launchers) with the following data:

- Two Aggregate Limits

- Additional Declared Values:

  -- Non-Deployed Aggregates
     --- SLBMs at Test Ranges

  -- Other Launcher Aggregates
     --- Test Launchers
     --- Training Launchers

- Facilities listed:

  -- Bases

  -- Loading Facilities

  -- Production Facilities
     --- SLBMs
     --- Ballistic Missile Submarines

  -- Storage Facilities

  -- Repair Facilities

  -- Test Ranges

  -- Training Facilities

-- Elimination Facilities

- Submarine base data included:

-- Name and Coordinates of Facility

-- Two Aggregate Numbers

-- Non-Deployed SLBMs

- Other facility data:

-- Non-Deployed SLBMs, TMOMs

¶17. (S) Trout continued that the Russian Federation's Section II: ICBMs, SLBMs, Warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, ICBM Launchers, and SLBM Launchers; (II) SLBMs, Warheads on SLBMs, SLBM Launchers, included the following data:

- Five aggregate limits would be declared at the beginning and for each base

- Additional Declared Values:

-- None

- Facilities listed:

-- Bases

-- Production Facilities
--- SLBMs
--- Ballistic Missile Submarines

-- Storage Facilities

-- Repair Facilities

-- Test Ranges

-- Training Facilities

-- Conversion or Elimination Facilities
--- SLBMs
--- Ballistic Missile Submarines

- SLBM base data included:

-- Name and Coordinates of Facility

- Other facility data:

-- Unknown

¶18. (S) Since Russia would provide the total number of non-deployed SLBM launchers at submarine bases, Trout asked whether Russia would provide the number of empty SLBM launchers in each 6-month update. Orlov affirmed this would be the case, with Ryzhkov adding it would be the case if the United States provided it. Trout did not respond, but promised to declare elimination facilities for both SLBMs and SLBM launchers.

HEAVY BOMBER DATA

¶19. (S) Trout continued that the United States would retain an MOU Annex C (Heavy Bombers) with the following data:

- Two Aggregate Limits

- Additional Declared Values:

-- Non-Deployed Aggregates

--- None

-- Other Aggregates
--- Test Heavy Bombers
--- Training Heavy Bombers

- The following facilities are listed:

-- Bases for Deployed Heavy Bombers

-- Production Facilities

-- Storage Facilities

-- Repair Facilities

-- Flight Test Centers

-- Training Facilities

-- Elimination Facilities

- Air base data included:

-- Name and Coordinates of Facility

-- Three Aggregate Numbers
--- Includes Nuclear Armaments Weapons Storage Areas with coordinates

- Other facility data:

-- Training Heavy Bombers, Test Heavy Bombers

¶20. (S) The Russian Federation's Section III: Heavy Bombers and Warheads on Them, would include the following data:

- Two aggregate limits would be declared at the beginning and for each base

- Sub-aggregate limits

-- Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs

-- Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs

-- Warheads on Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs

-- Warheads on Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs

- Additional Declared Values:

-- Non-Deployed Aggregates
--- Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers

-- Other Aggregates
--- Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments
--- Test Heavy Bombers
--- Training Heavy Bombers
--- Heavy Bombers Converted to Ground Trainers

- The following facilities are listed:

-- Bases for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs

-- Production Facilities

-- Storage Facilities

-- Repair Facilities

-- Flight Test Centers

-- Training Facilities

-- Conversion or Elimination Facilities

- Air base data included:

-- Name and Coordinates of Facility

- Other facility data:

-- Unknown

¶21. (S) Orlov asked Trout to clarify what was meant by the term "nuclear armaments weapons storage areas associated with each air base." Trout explained that, under the U.S. concept, accountable warheads could be either on heavy bombers or in storage facilities that were associated with the air base. Orlov asked whether it could be said that the storage facilities were situated at the air base. Trout clarified that the storage facilities could be at the air base or some distance from the base. Orlov asked how far away the storage facilities could be. Trout clarified further that the issue was not distance, but which facility provided the warheads that would be carried by the heavy bombers at an air base. In other words, the declared weapons storage area would be wherever the nuclear armaments that would be used to load the bomber would be drawn from. He said he was not talking about central storage.

¶22. (S) On receiving this clarification, Orlov asked about the U.S.-proposed verification regime for heavy bomber warheads. How did the United States propose to count such warheads? Trout explained that the U.S. vision was to report the number of warheads in storage at the storage facilities that directly support the heavy bomber airbase, as well as any warheads actually loaded on heavy bombers. The U.S.-proposed Inspection Protocol discussed warhead inspections at air bases to confirm the number of heavy bombers, the number of warheads on them, and the number in storage at weapons storage areas directly supporting the air bases. Orlov stated that the Russians had a different understanding on this issue and almost certainly would oppose it. Trout noted that this issue was broader than the purview of the MOU Working Group.

¶23. (S) Going through Russia's paper on the data base, Orlov sought to clarify areas of agreement and disagreement. He pressed for agreement to include Russia's five groupings of aggregate data somewhere in the MOU. Trout continued to resist, inasmuch as the United States characterized and grouped the data differently from Russia's proposal. The United States also had a different concept as to when or if a launcher or heavy bomber would be considered non-deployed. Trout confirmed that the U.S. proposed to provide complete, comprehensive data in the MOU and its annexes.

DISAPPEARANCE OF PEACEKEEPERS
AND SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES

¶24. (S) Orlov then asked whether the United States planned to declare its Peacekeeper ICBM silos as non-deployed launchers and the missiles as non-deployed ICBMs. Trout

informed him that Peacekeepers would not count in this treaty because they would not be an existing type as of treaty signature. Amid exclamations of "Why, why?" from several Russian participants, Orlov said that was not the correct answer. The Russian delegation would not be able to explain it to their leadership. Orlov asked how Russia would be able

to confirm that the Peacekeeper launchers were not launch-capable. He said further discussion was needed in the working groups and at higher levels.

¶25. (S) When asked about declaring static displays in the MOU, Trout confirmed that the United States would not include them, because the United States would consider static displays as eliminated items. Orlov promised that Russia would study that proposal.

¶26. (S) Orlov proposed that the sides agree to combine in the data base the facilities that were declared as space launch facilities and test ranges under START. Surprised at this new proposal, Trout asked what inspection rights would apply. Orlov repeated that Russia wanted to combine such facilities and call them all test ranges, with no verification measures. (Begin note: Orlov's statement was inconsistent with Russia's proposed treaty text, which states that visits shall be conducted at test ranges, inter alia. End note.)

¶27. (S) Documents exchanged:

-- U.S.:

- Side-by-side comparison of U.S. and Russian proposals for the MOU data base, dated September 29, 2009.

-- Russia:

- Unofficial paper titled, "Main Composition of Data Base the Parties Intend to Exchange under the New Treaty," dated September 29, 2009.

¶28. (S) Participants:

U.S.:

Mr. Trout
Lt Col Blevins
Ms. Bosco
Mr. Brown
Mr. Colby
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dwyer
Mr. Johnston
LT Lobner
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Ms. Gesse (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Orlov
Mr. Leontiev
Col Novikov

Mr. Pishchulov
Gen Poznikhir
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Gen Venevtsev
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)

¶29. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
RICHTER